FEED THE FUTURE

The U.S. Government's Global Hunger & Food Security Initiative

USAID FEED THE FUTURE GLOBAL PROGRAM EVALUATION FOR EFFECTIVENESS AND LEARNING (PEEL)

SYNTHESIS REPORT OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

MAY 2016 – MARCH 2022

USAID

FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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Photo Credit: Photos on the cover page are a collection of photos from various PEEL performance evaluations. Top row left to right: Lab for Collaborative Research on Assets and Market Access, Lab for Collaborative Research on Aquaculture and Fisheries, Farmer-to-Farmer, and FEEDBACK. Bottom row left to right: Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy, Innovation Lab for Genomics to Improve Poultry, Lab for Small-Scale Irrigation, and Livestock for Growth.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
AMA IL	The Innovation Lab for Assets and Markets
AquaFish	The Innovation Lab on Aquaculture and Fisheries
CAT	Community Agribusiness Team
CVC	Cereal Value Chain Activity
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
F2F	Farmer-to-Farmer Program
FSP IL	The Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy
FSSC	Food Security Service Center
GFSS	Global Food Security Strategy
GIP IL	The Innovation Lab for Genomics to Improve Poultry
GTN	Growth Through Nutrition
ILSSI	The Innovation Lab for Small Scale Irrigation
InnovATE	Innovation for Agricultural Training and Education
IR	Intermediate Result
KDAD	Knowledge Driven Agricultural Development
KM	Knowledge Management
L4G	Livestock for Growth
MARKETS II	Maximizing Agricultural Revenue in Key Target Sites
PAPA	Peace Corps Participating Agency Program Agreement
PEEL	Program Evaluation for Effectiveness and Learning
R4D	Research for Development
RADP	Regional Agricultural Development Program
RFS	Bureau of Resilience and Food Security
RQ	Research Question
SIL	The Soybean Innovation Lab
SSTP	Scaling Seeds and Technologies Activity
SVC	Strengthening Value Chains
UC	University of California
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VCA	Value Chain Activity
VCRD	Value Chains for Rural Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This global report synthesizes findings and lessons learned from 22 performance evaluations conducted by ME&A, Inc. under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Feed the Future Global Program Evaluation for Effectiveness and Learning (PEEL) task order from 2016 to 2022. The Feed the Future evaluations covered a range of sectors—value chain development, nutrition, finance, research, dissemination, policy development, and support activities—across 39 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.

This synthesis sought to answer four research questions (RQs):

1. *Adherence to Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) or Feed the Future Results Framework*: To what extent has the design and implementation of evaluated activities followed the GFSS or the Feed the Future Results Framework and the causal pathways identified therein?
2. *Effectiveness of interventions*: To what extent have the evaluated activities been effective? To what extent have they contributed to human and institutional capacity building and gender and youth inclusivity?
3. *Challenges and Opportunities*: What implementation or operational challenges exist? To what extent were evaluated activities able to address these challenges? What opportunities exist to improve implementation and/or adapt programming to meet intended results?
4. *Lessons Learned*: What generalizable lessons learned can be drawn from these evaluations for improving the design and implementation of Feed the Future agriculture, resilience, nutrition, and water activities in the future?

The methodology for this synthesis report relied on qualitative coding. After creating a codebook, the research team used the software program Atlas.ti to code the PEEL evaluation reports and identify common themes and findings. These results were then used to build a detailed outline. Limited availability of performance data for the evaluated activities, which would have shed more light on their effectiveness, was a limitation of this synthesis.

Evaluation synthesis findings for each of the research questions above are organized below by three project classifications: value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities; research and dissemination activities; and support service activities. Lessons learned and recommendations are presented at the end of each subsection.

Value Chain Development, Nutrition and Finance Activities

Many of the value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities' results frameworks deviated from the GFSS/Feed the Future results framework. These deviations were often semantic in nature or a matter of confusing logic.

In terms of interventions, on-farm trainings and demonstrations were generally found to be effective. Farmers reported implementing what they learned and seeing positive results. Hands-on trainings and demonstrations tended to be most effective, and the location and timing of trainings within the crop season were important factors of success. While trainings were largely successful, adoption of improved technologies was more limited and was a key constraint of many activities. That said, farmers consistently reported increased on-farm productivity and profitability. Reported yield increases ranged from 20 to 216 percent, while profit increases ranged from 57 to 115 percent. In both cases, there was wide variation across different value chains.

Market facilitation interventions tended to be less successful than production interventions. Sometimes this was due to poor value chain selection. Success tended to be greater when activities were more

involved in market facilitation interventions, but this raised questions about sustainability. Producer organization bulking had mixed success, and market access for farmers was often uneven.

Access to finance was a significant constraint across nearly all evaluated activities. Facilitating access to finance was more successful with larger, downstream actors, such as processors, who were often able to extend credit to their suppliers. Attempts to work with commercial banks had very limited success.

Nutrition did not receive much focus in the evaluated activities. Four evaluated activities had an explicit nutrition focus, with only one of these focusing exclusively on nutrition. Activities were able to raise awareness about the importance of nutrition, including at the national level. However, distribution of inputs for nutritious crops or of livestock was done on limited scale, and households were not always able to maintain the distributed crops and livestock over multiple seasons.

Women's participation varied widely across activities. In some activities, the target of 50 percent female participation proved challenging, which the activities attempted to overcome by making trainings more accessible or reducing land size requirements. A key factor in women's (and youth) participation was value chain selection and identifying appropriate opportunities within those value chains, which were not always on farm.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

There are certain value chains and improved practices that produce higher return for farmers. For example, investing in quality improvement practices in high value crops, such as coffee, appeared to be particularly successful. There is a limit, however, to the agricultural growth that can be achieved solely through improved on-farm production knowledge and practices gained through demonstrations and trainings. Eventually, investments in enhancing technologies such as improved seeds, fertilizer and mechanization will be needed for sustained, transformational agricultural growth. This requires access to finance, which was repeatedly cited as a key constraint. Moreover, working with farmers who have poor access to markets and/or small plots is less likely to generate significant agricultural growth.

Most interventions focused on the producer level, especially the smallholder. However, the evaluations identified opportunities to support value chain growth by working with off farm value chain actors.

The following recommendations were distilled from the value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities evaluated under PEEL:

1. Activity results frameworks should be more consistent and aligned with strategic-level frameworks, like the GFSS Results Framework, to ensure effective communication about shared goals, objectives, and anticipated results.
2. Value chain activity design and selection should be informed by value chain studies. These studies should identify market demand, places in the value chain where activity intervention can have the most impact, and opportunities for women and youth inclusion.
3. Activities should consider more focus on off-farm value chain interventions and actors, such as processors and input providers, who can drive value chain growth. These actors are also better positioned to access finance to implement new technologies and practices.
4. Access to finance should remain a top priority and innovative approaches to addressing this key constraint should be explored.

Research and Dissemination Activities

Most activities made significant research progress, including publishing journal articles, producing high quality research outputs, and generating strong national demand for their research outputs. A participatory approach - in which expatriate and national experts worked together and in alignment with government priorities – was important for success. Coordination with USAID and other actors was found

to be weak, however, and efforts to disseminate research, particularly new technologies, were limited by weak engagement with national agriculture technology ecosystems.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Evaluated activities demonstrated more progress in meeting their research objectives than their dissemination objectives. Achieving dissemination objectives was constrained by time and a lack of a coordinated dissemination strategy.

1. Better coordination and development of dissemination strategies is needed to ensure implementation plans can be informed and/or adapted in accordance with research findings.
2. Stronger facilitation and engagement with host country institutions and policymakers is needed to ensure research and dissemination objectives are reached.

USAID Support Activities

A demand driven technical consultant procurement activity was highly successful. However, the two evaluation and knowledge management support activities were found to be overly broad in their scope so that partners did not have a comprehensive set of capabilities to provide all service. Additionally, not all services were demand driven which in some cases led to limited use.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1. Support service activities should be focused on one or two related service offerings which are consistent with USAID Bureau and mission needs and/or demand.

STUDY BACKGROUND

This global report synthesizes findings and lessons learned from 22 performance evaluations conducted by ME&A, Inc. under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Feed the Future Global Program Evaluation for Effectiveness and Learning (PEEL) task order implemented from April 2016 through March 2022. The evaluations covered a range of sectors—value chain development, nutrition, finance, research, dissemination, policy development, and support activities—across 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Annex 2 contains a list of activities evaluated under PEEL, how they were classified for the purpose of this synthesis report, their locations, and whether they were midterm or final performance evaluations.

This global report aims to provide lessons learned and practical recommendations to inform future Feed the Future strategies and programming. The primary audiences for the global report are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau of Resilience and Food Security (RFS) and USAID missions.

This report attempts to answers four research questions (RQs).

1. *Adherence to Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS)/Feed the Future Results Framework*: To what extent has the design and implementation of evaluated activities followed the GFSS/Feed the Future Results Framework and the causal pathways identified therein?[1]
2. *Effectiveness of interventions*: To what extent have the evaluated activities been effective? To what extent have they contributed to human and institutional capacity building and gender and youth inclusivity?
3. *Challenges and Opportunities*: What implementation or operational challenges exist? To what extent were evaluated activities able to address these challenges? What opportunities exist to improve implementation and/or adapt programming to meet intended results?
4. *Lessons Learned*: What generalizable lessons learned can be drawn from these evaluations for improving the design and implementation of Feed the Future agriculture, resilience, nutrition, and water activities in the future?

METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

This global report was produced primarily through a qualitative analysis of the 22 performance evaluations produced under PEEL. The research team conducted the analysis in four stages. In the first stage, the team reviewed the 22 evaluations and created an inventory identifying key characteristics of each evaluation. The research team then sorted the evaluations into three classifications: 1) value chain, nutrition, and finance; 2) research and dissemination; and 3) support activities. The research team then created a study matrix showing possible sub-questions to answer the research questions. Based on the matrix, the team created a draft codebook to use with the qualitative analysis program Atlas.ti. In the second stage, the research team conducted pilot coding of two studies to test the appropriateness of the codebook. Based on this piloting, the team revised the codebook.

In the third stage of analysis, the research team coded the 22 evaluation reports. The evaluations were coded by the three classifications above. In the fourth and final stage, the team analyzed the coded excerpts. To do this, they read through coded content and wrote bulleted summaries of key findings into

[1] Note that this question has been amended to include the Feed the Future results framework which preceded the GFSS results framework.

a draft report outline. Using the outline, the team wrote the report. The analysis and drafting of the report were structured according to the three classifications identified above.

For the first research question, the team used a different modified approach, comparing activity- and strategy-level results frameworks without the use of Atlas.ti or qualitative codebooks. Where activity-level results frameworks were available, the research team counted how many activity objectives and Intermediate Results (IRs) were similar to those found in the Feed the Future results framework.[2]

Limitations

Synthesis findings were limited by the lack of available performance indicator data for most of the evaluated activities. These data would have provided a quantitative basis for addressing activity effectiveness and responding to RQ 2. A search of the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse found few reports containing these data. Following this failed search, interaction with USAID revealed that it would not be possible to find the needed data within the timeframe of the report. Consequently, the research team abandoned the plan to include these data.

The lack of comparability in the type of data used across evaluations also limited findings. For example, some evaluations reported on-farm yield changes based on activity monitoring data, others surveyed farmers asking if yields increased, and some used qualitative research, such as focus group discussions. Additionally, there was a lack of comparability in the types of information collected in each evaluation. For example, some evaluations probed the reasons farmers adopted technologies, while others did not. As a result, most synthesis findings are not drawn from across all included evaluations.

Because of the limited availability of performance data and lack of comparability of data collected across different evaluations, this report focused on identifying which types of interventions seemed to work better or worse, rather than the overall effectiveness of activities. The findings present evidence for and discussion of the varying effectiveness of activities and activity components, including possible explanations. This strategy is reflected in the report's structure where findings consider effectiveness (RQ 2) alongside of challenges and opportunities (RQ 3).

FINDINGS

This section presents findings for RQs 1 through 3 organized by the three classifications: 1) value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities; 2) research and dissemination activities; and 3) support activities. Findings for RQ 4 are presented in Section 4. As noted above, report findings address RQ 2 and RQ 3 jointly, combining evidence of effectiveness (RQ 2) with evidence of what was more and less effective and contributing factors (RQ 3). RQ 1 is addressed for value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities only.[3]

VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT, NUTRITION, AND FINANCE ACTIVITIES

In this section, findings for value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities are organized according to the Feed the Future results framework from 2012 (see Figure 1 below).[4] Following Section 3.1.1 below, which answers RQ 1 on adherence to the GFSS/Feed the Future results framework, the subsequent sub-sections correspond to the framework's IRs and objectives. As noted above, each sub-section addresses both RQ 2 on the effectiveness of interventions and RQ 3 on challenges and opportunities. Sections 3.1.2 through 3.1.5 focus on the IRs contributing to the Feed the Future results

[2] https://www.feedthefuture.gov/resource/feed-the-future-results-framework-2/

[3] Only three of eight research and dissemination project results frameworks were available so RQ 1 was not answerable for this type of project. The question was also not relevant for USAID support activities.

[4] The 2012 version of the results framework is used because most evaluated projects were designed before the 2016 GFSS results framework. This is reflected by the fact that no evaluated projects included new IRs introduced in the 2016 GFSS framework. The 2016 GFSS framework can be found in the annexes.

framework objective "inclusive agricultural sector growth." These IRs are increased productivity, expanded markets and trade, increased private investment, and increased employment. The short Section 3.1.6 addresses resilience, which is an IR in the Feed the Future results framework contributing to both inclusive agricultural sector growth and improved nutritional status. Section 3.1.7 addresses the objective "Improved nutritional status, especially for women and children." Finally, Sections 3.1.8 to 3.1.10 present findings for the cross-cutting IRs of capacity building, inclusion of women, and inclusion of youth.

Under the value chain development, nutrition and finance classification, there were a total of 11 activities evaluated.[5] Seven of these 11 activities are value chain development activities exclusively. Of these seven, five worked across multiple value chains that included high value crops such as cocoa and coffee, fruits, vegetables, cereals, and legumes. These activities took place in Burma, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Two value chain activities, both in Mali, focused on livestock and cereal crop value chains. The remining four activities focused on access to finance, nutrition, and deploying agricultural expert volunteers and Peace Corps volunteers to engage with local value chain actors and activities.

Adherence to the GFSS/Feed the Future Results Framework

The most common GFSS/Feed the Future objective targeted by the evaluated activities was inclusive agricultural sector growth. As shown in Annex 3, nine of ten available activity frameworks matched with the inclusive agricultural sector growth objective. Only two activities formally worked towards resilience (as an IR in 2012 and an objective in 2016). Three activities aimed at the nutrition objective. The most common IRs were improved productivity and expanded markets and trade.

Activity results frameworks sometimes confused the logic of IRs, objectives, and goals or used language different than in the GFSS/Feed the Future strategic frameworks. For example, the Strengthening Value Chains (SVC) activity in the DRC listed the objective as "reduce extreme poverty and malnutrition in the target populations." This clearly aligns closer with the Feed the Future goal than any one objective. Many others used language that was not consistent with the GFSS/Feed the Future strategic results frameworks. For example, the Ethiopia Value Chain Activity (VCA) listed its purpose as "improve the performance of the agriculture sector." This confusion extends to the level of sub-purposes and outputs. For example, one sub-purpose is "increase nutrition sensitive productivity of targeted value chains inclusive of women and youth," a formulation that combines two objectives or IRs. Additionally, what are modeled to contribute to achieving this sub-purpose are labeled as outputs when they should in fact be IRs or outcomes. For example, "increase availability of, access to, and consumption of safe, diverse foods" is labeled as an output but is clearly an outcome mimicking the IR in the 2012 Feed the Future results framework titled "increase access to diverse and quality foods."

There are many cases of confused or divergent logic in the results frameworks. In Nigeria, the Maximizing Agricultural Revenue in Key Target Sites (MARKETS II) activity included the objective of "increased smallholder income agricultural development promoted through enhanced private sector participation and investment." This objective seems to encompass the IR that would lead to it. However, the activity IR is "increased smallholder income," along with "increased women's income from agricultural value chains." This is obviously a muddled tautology: increased income leads to increased income. In Ethiopia, the Growth Through Nutrition Activity (GTN) had the objective of "reduce stunting by 20 percent; generate global learning; sustain programs." This objective is actually one indicator target and two objectives.

[5] The Peace Corps Participating Agency Program Agreement (PAPA) was originally classified under USAID support activities. However, it was moved to the value chain category as volunteers were working primarily with farmers not USAID, and the evaluation results were therefore more consistent thematically with the value chain development category than the USAID support activities category.

While it is not clear that these deviations from the GFSS/Feed the Future results frameworks had implications on activity implementation, the confusing and inaccurate terminology used suggests diminished ability to clearly communicate an activity's theory of change and logic.

IR: Increased Agricultural Production

Agricultural production, which falls under IR 1 of the Feed the Future results framework, was the primary focus of the evaluated activities. Agricultural production interventions under the evaluated activities focused on on-farm trainings, demonstrations, and access to inputs.

In general, the evaluations showed trainings and demonstrations to be effective in increasing the application of improved practices. Throughout the assessments, the evaluation teams measured training effectiveness through trainees' self-assessments of usefulness, whether trainees applied what they had learned, and trainees' assessments of the causal relationship between applying what they had learned and production or profitability outcomes. For example, in the VCA evaluation in the DRC, 92 percent of surveyed coffee farmers said they had implemented what they had learned during training. In the Burma Value Chains for Rural Development (VCRD) evaluation, sesame farmers who implemented the training on making natural fertilizer reported that their production costs decreased. Similarly, a VCRD-supported melon farmers group stated that approximately 85 percent of their members had adopted improved fertilizer practices following training, resulting in increased yields. In Ethiopia, VCA-supported coffee farmers reported that trainings on best practices for coffee harvesting contributed to increased yields. In Mali, farmers expressed satisfaction with Livestock for Growth (L4G) trainings on animal fattening, stating that they no longer waited to sell their livestock, which now led to increased profits from livestock sales.

Farmers also often reported that demonstrations and more hands-on trainings were more effective than more theoretically based trainings. In Afghanistan, farmers supported by the Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) said that demonstrations in greenhouses, fields, and vineyards were more effective than lectures or classroom settings. In Ethiopia and Nigeria, farmers supported by the VCA and MARKETS II activities confirmed demonstrations as the most effective training method, while in Nigeria farmers also cited farm calendars as an effective way to retain what they had learned.

Farmers identified the location and timing of trainings and demonstrations as important considerations for their success. VCRD-supported farmers in Burma observed that trainings should be as local as possible in order to increase attendance. This observation applied particularly to women. In Mali, the L4G activity tried to expand dissemination of feed and fodder best practices through trained producer organization representatives, but the practice was unsuccessful because farmers did not want to travel long distances without receiving a per diem. In addition to training proximity, farmers noted the importance of training timing. VCRD-supported farmers in Burma said trainings should be in the offseason when they have more time but should not be too late in the season when they will have to wait a long time to apply new practices.

In Mali, L4G attempted to generate scale through two multi-tier training and input dissemination models. The approaches aimed to overcome the geographic, resource, and duration limitations of direct technical assistance. In one model, L4G recruited veterinarians, provided them with a startup equipment kit, and trained 76 veterinary assistants affiliated with the vets. While the model suffered from high attrition—only about one-third of those vets and veterinary assistants remained active at the time of the assessment—the evaluation still found the practice to be successful in increasing livestock vaccination and access to other veterinary services. L4G also tried to scale feed and fodder best practices by training producer organization representatives to disseminate best practices to other members. As discussed above, the distance and members' unwillingness to attend trainings uncompensated contributed to these trainings' lack of effectiveness. Still, the evaluation found that informal exchange of improved practice did take place.

While participants generally found trainings to be useful, leading to adoption of promoted practices, adoption of improved inputs was less successful. For example, in the DRC, 88 percent of SVC coffee

farmer respondents said they had adopted the improved agronomic practices they learned, but only 34 percent said they had increased their use of quality seeds, chemicals, or equipment. Across many of the evaluations, farmers cited limited access to improved inputs, including affordability of inputs as a key constraint (RADP, VCA, MARKETS II, SVC, L4G).

Through the use of improved practices, farmers also improved the quality of their production after receiving training support**.** In Nigeria, for example, buyers found cocoa quality to be better after MARKETS II introduced new pruning, spraying, harvesting, and storage methods. Also in Nigeria, a rice miller reported that the rice from supported farmers was higher quality and earned a higher price, further noting the improved quality saved his business from collapse. A soybean processor had a similar story and said that his machinery broke more frequently from debris in beans before MARKETS II farmer trainings.

Agricultural production interventions increased farmers yield and profitability. These results varied across value chains with increased yields ranging from 57 to 115 percent and increased profits ranging from 57 to 81 percent. For example, in Ethiopia, VCA beneficiary farmers reported production and income from activity-targeted crops to have increased by between 57 and 81 percent across all of VCA's six value chains (maize, chickpea, coffee, dairy, meat and live animals, and poultry). In Mali, 90 percent of L4G participants reported making more money from livestock sales after the activity. In Nigeria, new practices introduced by MARKETS II increased the yield and gross margins of fingerling, casava, and cocoa farmers, each by close to 100 percent. In the DRC, 87 percent of SVC coffee farmers said their coffee production increased, and 99 percent said they hoped to expand their production.

IR: Expanded Markets and Trade

The success of market facilitation activities was mixed at best. For example, in the DRC, only 20 and 25 percent of SVC respondents said that the activity had increased their access to market information and created new market linkages. In Afghanistan, less than a quarter of RADP farmer respondents cited market linkage improvements.

Poorly informed selection of value chains impacted effectiveness. VCRD in Burma promoted organic ginger because of high export prices. However, a limited export market forced farmers to sell their organic ginger on the local market, which offered no premium for organic ginger. Production costs for organic ginger were higher, however, resulting in losses for farmers vis-à-vis conventional production. In the DRC, SVC promoted soybean production, in part for its nutritional benefits. However, farmers grew soybean nearly exclusively for sale, and limited access to the required processing equipment weakened the local output market. In both cases, the wasted resources—including farmers' time and willingness to try new things—could have been avoided with better initial value chain assessments.

Some intensive market facilitation interventions succeeded in the short term but activities lacked plans to sustain that success. In Burma, stakeholders viewed VCRD's coffee marketing initiatives as very successful. The activity worked throughout the value chain, introducing dry processing of fresh coffee berries, building capacity of farmers and processors to meet end-market requirements, training coffee graders on international standards, linking processors to markets, and contributing to coffee branding for export. However, the evaluation cast doubt on the sustainability of progress in the coffee sector due to the activity's heavy-handed approach in contacting buyers, sending samples, and monitoring harvest and processing for farmers. It was unclear who would perform these activities after the project ended.

Producer organization bulking, especially for cereal crops, proved challenging. In the DRC, between 68 and 84 percent of SVC respondents said that the lack of capacity of their producer group to bulk crops was a challenge. In Mali, the Cereal Value Chain (CVC) activity found that smallholder cereal farmers produce little surplus, making bulking and marketing challenging. Nevertheless, through producer organizations, farmers were able to generate enough surplus to sell, and the activity facilitated contracts with buyers for eight out of 11 producer organizations. This brought producers higher prices and market access stability. However, the producers' inability to consistently meet buyer quantity and quality

requirements endangered sustainability. The activity attempted to facilitate producer organization storage with mixed success. Constraints included the lack of good facilities, the need to sell in emergencies, and theft. In the end, the CVC evaluation recommended consolidating small producer organizations into larger ones.

Even where market facilitation efforts succeeded, not all farmers had market access. In Burma, the VCRD activity successfully introduced dry processing of fresh berries, supported three processors to upgrade, and linked them to farmers and higher value export markets. However, poorer coffee farmers reportedly could not participate because of limited ability to invest and the need to be paid immediately, as dry processing takes 10 to 20 days longer than wet processing. The evaluators estimated that 10 times more farmers could be included without these barriers. In Nigeria, the MARKETS II evaluation found that activity marketing interventions improved the market opportunities for only 17 out of 33 farmers groups. Those that had improved market opportunities lived close to markets and had good all-season roads. Those who did not have improved market opportunities lived further away from markets and lacked good roads.

IR: Increased Private Sector Investment

Access to finance remained a consistent and significant constraint in the evaluated activities. In the DRC, only 11 percent of SVC coffee farmers and 17 percent of bean farmers said the activity had increased their access to finance. In Nigeria, 94 percent of the MARKETS II producer groups did not have access to finance. Furthermore, the midterm evaluation of the global Farmer-to-Farmer (F2F) activity found that two-thirds of hosts could not implement certain volunteer recommendations due to financial constraints. Constraints included high interest rates, lack of collateral, and lack of farmer confidence about the risk-return tradeoff. A VCRD-supported farmer group in Burma, for example, noted that in order to take the credit risk to implement the activity-recommended agricultural package, they would first need to have more confidence that the recommended package would be profitable.

Activities had more success in facilitating access to finance with large-scale farmers or agribusinesses. For example, in Nigeria, MARKETS II facilitated 42 loans worth $5.7 million to larger farmers and agribusinesses. In Mali, CVC facilitated nearly $7 million in financing for value chain actors, but 60 percent went to one actor. This rice miller extended more credit to smallholder suppliers after receiving financing. The miller offered a premium for timely repayment, and half of CVC-affiliated farmers received this premium. In the DRC, SVC facilitated a similar arrangement. It helped buyers and processors with business plans, contingent upon them agreeing to extend credit and other assistance to their suppliers. These arrangements were relatively new and had not yet significantly expanded access to finance at the time of the evaluation.

Several activities attempted to work with commercial banks in agriculture, but with very limited success. In Nigeria, an assessment carried out by MARKETS II found commercial banks' limited knowledge of agriculture to be a constraint to lending to farmers. The activity trained bank staff on agricultural lending and provided 50 percent de-risking for farmer lending. Neither initiative was successful, and banks extended finance at other places in the value chain to meet a government requirement for agricultural lending.

Working in microfinance proved to be more successful. In Rwanda, the Nguriza Nshore activity attempted to engage with commercial banks to increase their agricultural lending. However, the activity had difficulty forming partnerships with commercial banks, which were looking for actors who brought capital. As with MARKETS II, Nguriza Nshore made more progress strengthening the capacity of microfinance institutions with most trainees reporting making governance, loan management, and business continuity improvements following training. These findings illustrated the challenge of accessing finance for farms or agribusinesses which are too big for microfinance, but not large or sophisticated enough for commercial bank financing.

Several projects worked to overcome this challenge. In Mali, CVC trained financial intermediaries to help producer organizations prepare business plans and other requirements necessary to access formal

financing. This initiative was successful at expanding access to finance for producer organizations. However, the activity paid the commission for the financial intermediaries, and it was unclear if either borrowers or banks would be willing to cover the commission once the activity ended. In Rwanda, Nguriza Nshore supported a business providing factoring. Factoring allows small business to receive short-term credit based on invoices approved but not yet paid by buyers. This allowed the small business to acquire working capital to overcome buyer payment delays.

IR: Increased Employment Opportunities in Targeted Value Chains

Two activities reported strong job creation. In the DRC, seasonal on-farm employment in the SVC-supported specialty coffee value chain increased from 190 to 2,469.[6] Seasonal labor shortages were also observed in Burma, with some VCRD-supported farmers harvesting early to get access to a limited labor supply. In Rwanda, Nguriza Nshore recorded strong job creation impact through the small and medium business loans and investments it facilitated, which helped businesses avoid having to lay workers off or face bankruptcy during the pandemic.

Off-farm job creation potential may be higher than on-farm. The Peace Corps Participating Agency Program Agreement (PAPA) evaluation in Zambia noted that while interventions were focused mostly on the farm, off-farm employment in agriculture-related business had more potential. The Nguriza Nshore evaluation in Rwanda also supported this finding: employment multipliers were found to be higher for off farm rather than on farm financing.

IR: Increased Resilience of Vulnerable Communities and Households

Only two evaluated activities included a focus on resilience. In Burma, most VCRD farmers interviewed reported increased knowledge of the negative effects of agriculture on the environment and had increased their use of improved practices for herbicide and pesticide application. In Mali, the L4G activity aimed to increase resilience during the six month "hunger period" when crops were in the field but not yet harvested. However, despite 90 percent of respondents reporting increased incomes, only 56 percent reported livelihood improvements during the hunger period.

IR: Increased Consumption of Nutritious and Safe Diets

Four evaluated activities included nutrition components with one activity (GTN) focusing exclusively on nutrition. VCA in Ethiopia had the largest focus on nutrition of the value chain activities. It provided training on household nutrition. Over 80 percent of trainees agreed that training led to consumption of a more diversified and nutritious diet and improved nutritional status. VCA also provided home gardening kits, which were appreciated by recipients, but the intervention only reached less than 1 percent of beneficiaries. The evaluation found that animal sourced food production was perceived by households to have more nutritional benefit than the crops the activity promoted because animal sourced food production directly provides highly nutritious foods to households. In the DRC, SVC promoted the consumption of dry bean and soybean through radio ads. However, the activity did not track the effectiveness of these advertisements on nutrition outcomes.[7]

Stakeholders viewed the GTN activity in Ethiopia to have increased awareness about nutrition, but not to sustained access to nutritious foods. The GTN activity also promoted awareness of the importance of nutrition sensitive agriculture such as fruits, vegetables, and livestock. In fact, the Ministry of Agriculture has included nutrition sensitive agriculture in its new agricultural policy as a result of GTN. The activity also introduced nutritious and agronomically appropriate foods, like avocado and apples, and distributed

[6] Note that this activity tracked jobs created even though it did not include an employment IR in its results framework. This is likely because it was designed based on the 2016 GFSS results framework, which drops the employment IR what was included in the 2012 Feed the Future version.

[7] PAPA also worked in nutrition, especially training on cooking nutritious food. However, the evaluation did not present evidence of the intervention's effectiveness.

livestock and crop inputs to vulnerable households. However, in many cases the evaluation team did not find evidence that the households still had the livestock or were cultivating the crops. Additionally, water access was a constraint to year-round nutritious food production and the evaluation team found the activity's limited training on recycling water was insufficient.

Cross-Cutting: Capacity Building

Efforts to build the capacity of individuals and organizations had mixed success. As described earlier, in Mali, L4G's unsuccessful efforts to build the capacity of producer organization representatives to train other members resulted from members' unwillingness to travel for training without compensation. Efforts to train a network of veterinarian assistants were more successful, although there was a high attrition rate. The MARKETS II evaluation concluded that capacity building of farmers through groups, associations, and public private partnerships was largely successful, whereas in the DRC, beneficiaries viewed SVC producer organization capacity as weak, especially their governance, managerial, and marketing capacity. In fact, only 39 percent of SVC beneficiaries agreed that the producer organizations were offering more services since activity start. In general, low levels of human capacity, including low literacy rates, pose a challenge for producer organization capacity building.

The most successful examples of capacity building were evidenced by the Community Agribusiness Teams (CATs) in Mali. These were added in the third year of the CVC activity to strengthen the agribusiness capacity of producer organizations. The CATs included eight youth community members who were selected by producer organization members. CATs provided producer organizations with a range of production, storage, and marketing services. The evaluation team found that all CATs were still functioning well and serving their intended purposes at the time of the final evaluation.

Cross-Cutting: Inclusion of Women

Women's participation varied widely across the evaluated activities. Activities often aimed to achieve a 50:50 female to male ratio. In Burma, women's participation in VCRD-supported producers' groups varied from 10 to 50 percent. In Mali, the CVC activity increased women's participation from 20 percent to 47 percent by the end of the activity. In Nigeria, the MARKETS II activity had 62 percent women's participation and women saw productivity gains of at least 50 percent in each of the activity-supported value chains. In the DRC, the evaluation team found women's productivity across the different SVC-supported value chains to be comparable to men.

The activities used various approaches to successfully increase women's participation. In Nigeria, MARKETS II had initial challenges meeting its target of 50 percent participation by women, and its field staff spent significant time attempting to motivate producer associations to add more women and starting new associations for women themselves. The project eventually met its target through increased female participation in value chains where women were already present and in value chains where women had limited participation. MARKETS II and PAPA also reduced the minimum landholding size for participation, making more women eligible. In Burma, the VCRD evaluation made several recommendations to increase women's participation, including adding more female trainers, hosting trainings in more accessible locations and at more convenient meeting times for women, and using local languages spoken by women. In Ethiopia, VCA provided childcare services during trainings to make it easier for women to attend. In Mali, after starting out with very low women's participation, CVC conducted a gender assessment and found that significant constraints to women's participation included capital, time, literacy, and social stigma. As a result, the activity focused on working with women's cooperatives with an emphasis on household consumption and revenue together with a mentorship program. Mentorship program participants held the program in high regard, claiming that it increased women's skills and confidence.

In addition to encouraging women's participation in activity activities, activities also aimed to increase their leadership roles in producer organizations and cooperatives. However, the CVC and SVC evaluations in Mali and the DRC found that low female literacy levels posed challenges to women's abilities to perform

in these roles, recommending functional literacy training for female leadership candidates. Yet, activities had successes increasing women's leadership roles, and where this happened, it had a positive impact. For example, PAPA supported woman master farmers in Senegal who said that their producer organization leadership roles had given them more credibility and respect from local authorities.

Significant constraints to women's participation still existed. The evaluations noted male buy-in and selection of activity value chains as significant constraints to women's participation. In Afghanistan, some female RADP participants said that their husbands supported them after seeing the additional money they brought to the household. In Zambia, PAPA-supported female livestock entrepreneurs expressed gratitude for the added household income earned as a result of activity interventions. In Ethiopia, GTN training on household nutrition did not include men who were therefore unaware of the benefits and thus were less supportive of the training.

In Ethiopia, the VCA evaluation found that higher land and capital requirements made crop value chains less suitable for women (and youth) than animal value chains. In particular, women deemed the poultry and dairy value chains to be the most attractive to them, although they also found meat and live animals attractive. Of the crop value chains, farmers believed coffee to be most suitable for women, who were especially active in seedling production. Despite poultry's attractiveness to women producers, high feed costs limited production profitability.

Cross-Cutting: Inclusion of Youth

Several evaluations highlighted the need for agriculture interventions to require low investment and yield quick profits to appeal to youth. To increase youth engagement, the MARKETS II activity in Nigeria began promoting beekeeping and spraying services for youth, both of which yield quick profits with minimum investment. The evaluation also found youth to be more active in off-farm value chain activities. In Ethiopia, VCA had success with youth selling hermetic bags, providing spray services, and selling coffee seedlings, all of which involve limited investment and quick profits. In Mali, CVC successfully engaged youth in agribusiness advisory roles for their producer groups.

RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES

In total, eight Feed the Future research and dissemination activity evaluations were included in this global synthesis report. These evaluated activities included the Innovation Lab for Assets and Markets (AMA IL), Innovation Lab on Aquaculture and Fisheries (AquaFish), Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy (FSP IL), Innovation Lab for Genomics to Improve Poultry (GIP IL), Innovation Lab for Small Scall Irrigation (ILSSI), Innovation for Agricultural Training and Education (InnovATE) activity, Scaling Seeds and Technologies Activity (SSTP), and Soybean Innovation Lab (SIL).

Research

Most of the activities evaluated made strong progress towards intended research outcomes. Evaluation sometimes assessed research progress based on the quality of relevant research outputs, such as the number of peer-reviewed journal publications. For example, the University of California (UC) Davis-led GIP IL had 38 publications at various stages of development at the time of the evaluation and had made significant progress developing ecotypes of chickens resistant to New Castle Disease. The AMA IL, also led by UC Davis, produced a body of research and pilot activities on weather index insurance.[8] The Michigan State University-led FSP IL was so successful in producing country-led demand-driven research products it struggled to keep up with demand.

Stakeholders saw a participatory research approach as critical for success. FSP IL conducted studies with participation of host country institutions and experts. This built ownership of results and improved the

[8] Weather index insurance ties insurance claim payouts to weather indexes, simplifying and expediting claims and lowering operational and premium costs.

likelihood of external application. Sixty (60) percent of FSP IL stakeholder respondents preferred a mixed team involving local and expatriate researchers to all expatriate or all local teams. Evaluators also found ILSSI's participatory implementation to be a key to its successes. Aligning the activity with the government's own objectives to promote small scale irrigation aided ILSSI's participatory nature.

Applied research, or Research for Development (R4D), posed several challenges. The SIL evaluation found that academic researchers may not be accustomed to doing applied research. Additionally, this type of research may require more funding flexibility than conventional research. Another challenge was financing the technologies being tested. The ILSSI evaluation found SIL did not make farmers who were using the technologies aware that they would have to pay for them. Farmers were reluctant to pay after learning of this expectation. Furthermore, on-farm data collection and management for ILSSI was initially of low quality until the international implementing partners became more involved.

Research activities excluded important topics that could have provided more value to users. A wide range of FSP IL evaluation respondents said that they wished the activity had focused on international trade rules and regulations in the context of food security. The SIL evaluation found that although food manufacturers had reported marketing challenges, SIL directed little research to attempting to overcome these challenges or other issues throughout the value chain except for those related to smallholder producers and processers. The evaluation found that the activity had not done any sort of value chain mapping that would have identified these issues.

Weak coordination of research activities, especially with USAID, was another challenge. InnovATE's biggest challenge was the USAID Mission's lack of demand for and engagement with InnovATE's research activities, a significant challenge given the activity's USAID demand-driven design. Even non-demand driven activities, the lack of coordination with USAID hampered performance. The AMA IL evaluation found that coordination between researchers and Feed the Future activities was limited and that the missions themselves did not do much to encourage coordination. In Tanzania, a USAID-funded activity with geographical and topical overlap with AMA IL had no awareness of the latter's work. AquaFish respondents also reported a lack of engagement from USAID missions. These findings imply a missed opportunity to identify symbiotic opportunities for research design and dissemination.

Dissemination

Research activities needed more time to develop and disseminate technologies then the typical four- or five-year project period. Because of the longer time frame needed for successful technology dissemination, evaluations did not provide conclusive evidence on dissemination results. Several GIP IL researchers noted that despite having made strong progress in developing New Castle Disease resistant ecotypes, the activity would likely need more time beyond the activity period for validation and distribution. AMA IL, for example, which had multiple iterations starting in 1996, had time to leverage its long-standing work and credibility on index-based livestock insurance to access a broad range of stakeholders that can aid dissemination. Both the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments launched programs incorporating AMA IL's learnings on index-based livestock insurance. The SIL evaluation also found that more time was needed for effective dissemination and recommended USAID fund extension follow-up to ensure dissemination of research learnings.

A lack of knowledge of and relationships within the national agriculture technology dissemination ecosystem undermined dissemination efforts. The AMA IL evaluation found that research leads were unable to identify key stakeholders through which results could be disseminated most effectively and did not have relationships with key senior government officials or private sector actors. The activity produced research outputs consistent with Ghana's own priorities, but Ghanaian officials were not familiar with AMA IL results nor did AMA IL develop formal mechanisms to put activity research products in front of key decision-makers, including at USAID. On the other hand, activities were able to disseminate research outputs on the international level, such as through conferences and peer-reviewed publications. FSP IL

was credited with changing international donor thinking on development in Burma through research outputs it presented at national conferences.

Weak or missing communication strategies limited activity awareness and dissemination effectiveness. FSP IL evaluation respondents noted that the activity lacked a communication strategy, including one to monitor the effectiveness of various outreach initiatives. The AMA IL evaluation suggested that proposal requirements did not require applicants to specify a realistic and detailed dissemination and communication strategy. For better communication, the InnovATE and FSP IL evaluations recommended making research products available in both English and local languages. AquaFish was found to have effective communication and coordination, owing at least in part to the cohesiveness of the international aquaculture research community.

Activities sometimes neglected to support feedback loops from the field to government officials. In Burma, community leaders knew their communities had been studied through FSP IL and wanted to learn about the results and receive copies of reports and briefs. They intended to communicate them upwards to their parliamentarian leaders. The AMA IL evaluation observed that the activity's village-level impacts had not been communicated upwards to affect national-level change. Similarly, feedback from farmers and other technology users to researchers had weaknesses. The SIL evaluation found no systematic method of collecting feedback from technology users to inform refinement and development of research outputs.

Cross Cutting: Capacity Building

Stakeholders viewed capacity building of host country nationals very positively. Often this occurred simply through extended collaboration with high-level researchers, as was the case with FSP IL and AMA IL. In other cases (*i.e.*, AquaFish, GIP IL, and ILSSI), capacity building occurred through initiatives aiming to strengthen the capacity of local researchers. However, capacity building of host country students remained a challenge. Only 10 percent of AMA IL's student trainees were from Africa, an issue also identified by some GIP IL respondents. Stakeholders viewed this as a systemic weakness that might soon change due to the emergence of new African economics graduate programs and consortia.

The activities also engaged in institutional capacity building. In Burma, FSP IL's two-and-a-half-year collaboration with a think tank increased staff capacity to the point where many left for jobs or for graduate degree programs overseas. The capacity building included formal training on research methods and on-the-job training. AMA IL's collaboration with rural banks on farm risk assessment built the bank's capacity, and two of the banks were considering expanding their services as a result. Additionally, AMA IL's partnerships with local research firms increased partner data collection capacity.

Cross-Cutting: Inclusion of Women

Some activities aimed to include women as researchers, staff, and beneficiaries, with mixed success. AquaFish had 48 percent women participants in its long-term degree seeking training and 44 percent in its short-term trainings. GIP IL, on the other hand, found it difficult to find qualified women staff, technicians, and data analysts. Women constituted half of ILSSI's on-farm trainees. However, the activity's scientific training had only between 12 and 25 percent women despite accepting 95 percent of female applicants and 50 percent of male applicants. The ILSSI activity saw this as a result of women being a small minority of graduates in agricultural science in the countries where the activity operated.

USAID SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Three USAID support activities are included in this global synthesis. FEEDBACK supported Feed the Future missions with performance monitoring, impact evaluation and knowledge management (KM) services. Knowledge Driven Agricultural Development (KDAD) supported Feed the Future with KM services. The Food Security Service Center (FSSC) was a consultant procurement activity aimed at delivering top-flight experts to support USAID missions and mission-supported activities.

Evaluation and Knowledge Management Support

The evaluation found FEEDBACK to be modestly successful at meeting performance monitoring objectives, but not successful in meeting impact evaluation and KM objectives. Respondents rated progress towards improved rigor and use of performance monitoring as 3.8 and 3.5 out of 5, respectively. Progress towards using impact evaluations to better understand Feed the Future's impacts and adoption of improved impact evaluation methods both scored 2.8 out of 5. All respondents were able to access and use the activity management data, but most were unable to access impact evaluations under FEEDBACK, and only some reported using the KM products. Scale back affected the activity's KM performance, as FEEDBACK was scaled back twice due to an overly ambitious scope.

In addition to its scope, FEEDBACK faced several other challenges. For example, the implementer, a domestic research organization, had little international development experience and did not operate offices in any of the implementing countries. While the implementer brought high-level evaluation and KM expertise, the evaluation found its fieldwork standards to be overly rigid and complicated for a developing country context. Additionally, the evaluation found that the activity itself was too complex for one implementer and that, rather than starting large and scaling down, it should have started small and scaled up. Finally, the evaluation concluded that the activity should have produced easier to consume KM materials, like impact evaluation briefs or KM events.

Overall, KDAD failed to achieve more targets than it met. Two areas where KDAD performed well included supporting the Feed the Future monitoring system (a database of Feed the Future indicator performance) and an evaluation synthesis report. Yet, it fell short in the areas of communications and performance evaluations. The communications failures resulted from a misalignment of expectations and capabilities as KDAD was unable to meet USAID's need for rapid communication products. Although not part of the original agreement, KDAD conducted performance evaluations; however, it did not possess the full technical capability for this task. In addition, staff turnover, ad hoc and hectic work assignments, and lack of a consistent understanding of and expectations for the activity were found to be constraints.

Expert Consultant Procurement Support

FSSC aimed to provide high-quality technical consultants to USAID missions, RFS, USAID/Washington operating units, and host country counterparts. The evaluation found overwhelmingly positive results, with consultant service users pleased with the quality of work the consultants provided. Furthermore, the mechanism responded quickly to requests for consultants. The implementer did not have to market the service, since USAID demand for its service was strong.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT, NUTRITION, AND FINANCE ACTIVITIES

Activity results frameworks sometimes showed confusing logic and were not always aligned or consistent with the Feed the Future or GFSS Results Framework. This may not have affected implementation, but likely hindered the activities' ability to communicate a theory of change and shared goals and objectives with the Feed the Future Initiative.

> **Recommendation**: Activity results frameworks should be more consistent and aligned with strategic-level frameworks, like the GFSS Results Framework, to ensure effective communication about shared goals, objectives, and anticipated results.

IR: Increased Agricultural Production

There may be certain value chains and types of improved practices that produce higher return for farmers. The evaluations suggest that a focus on production and post-harvest quality improvement practices in high value crops, such as coffee, were particularly successful.

> **Recommendation**: Value chain selection and activity design should be informed by value chain studies.[9] These studies can verify market demand, identify places in the value chain where activity intervention can have the most impact, including opportunities for women and youth to engage.

IR: Expanded Markets and Trade

Putting more focus on off-farm interventions and actors, such as processors and input providers, within the value chains can help drive growth. These actors are also better positioned to access finance to implement new technologies and practices.

> **Recommendation**: Activities should consider more focus on off-farm value chain interventions and opportunities to help drive sector growth.

IR: Increased Private Sector Investment

Respondents repeatedly cited access to finance as a key limitation. Evaluated activities gave relatively limited attention to access to finance, despite it being a consistent constraint across all evaluations. Those that did aim to address access to finance had limited success, primarily through facilitating access to finance for larger firms who then extended it further down the value chain. Smallholders have some access to limited microfinancing and larger agricultural businesses access to commercial bank financing, but overall access to finance is perhaps the key constraint to agricultural sector growth.

> **Recommendation**: Access to finance should remain a top priority and innovative approaches to addressing this key constraint should be explored.

Cross-Cutting IRs: Inclusion of Women and Youth

Activities often set targets of 50 percent women inclusion. However, attempts to achieve these targets did not always prioritize occupations within value chains that were accessible for women. Several activities did reduce their land size requirement to increase participation.

[9] Market systems activities should also be informed by a market systems study.

As with women, targeting value chains and roles within those value chains to enhance youth participation is crucial. Off-farm employment in the value chain requiring limited capital may offer more opportunity for youth to engage.

> **Recommendation**: Value chain activities should be informed by value chain studies that consider opportunities for women and youth to engage (see full recommendation above).

RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES

Evaluated activities demonstrated more progress in meeting their research objectives than their dissemination objectives. Achieving dissemination objectives was constrained by the time needed to conduct the research and a lack of a coordinated dissemination strategy that could quickly integrate the research findings into implementation plans.

> **Recommendation**: Better coordination and development of dissemination strategies is needed to ensure activity design and implementation is informed by USAID research findings.

USAID did not sufficiently collaborate with research and dissemination activities. Where mentioned, respondents nearly always regarded collaboration with USAID as weak. This missed opportunity likely hamstrung research and dissemination activity effectiveness. USAID missions have connections and access to national-level stakeholders that could make research more relevant and dissemination more effective.

> **Recommendation**: Stronger facilitation and engagement with host country institutions and policymakers is needed to ensure research and dissemination objectives are reached. This means requiring research activities to prepare communication strategies and introducing activities to key national stakeholders.

USAID SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Support service activities faced challenges in adequately providing a range of requested services, largely because partners did not have a comprehensive set of capabilities to provide such services. Additionally, some services did not appear to correspond with user demand.

> **Recommendation**: Support service activities should be focused on one or two related service offerings and should be consistent with USAID Bureau and mission needs and/or demand.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: REFERENCES

AMA IL, "Performance Evaluation Report Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Collaborative Research on Assets and Market Access (AMA IL)," March 2018.

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SSTP, "Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership (SSTP) in Africa: Wave Two Survey Report Smallholder Farmers' Adoption of Improved Seeds in Program Areas," July 2019.

SIL, "Performance Evaluation Report for Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Soybean Value Chain Research (Soybean Innovation Lab) (SIL)," March 2018.

VCA, "Final Performance Evaluation of the Feed the Future Ethiopian Value Chain Activity," September 2021.

VCRD, "Feed the Future Performance Evaluation of the Value Chains for Rural Development (VC-RD) Activity in Burma," May 2018.

ANNEX 2: EVALUATED ACTIVITIES

Activity Name	Period	Location/s	Type	Evaluation
Growth through Nutrition (GTN)	2016–2022	Ethiopia	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
Nguriza Nshore	2018–2022	Rwanda	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
Strengthen Value Chain Activity (SVC)	2017–2022	DRC	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
The Ethiopia Value Chain Activity (VCA)	2017–2021	Ethiopia	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Final
Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP) (x2)	2016–2021	Afghanistan	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
Value Chains for Rural Development (VCRD)	2013–2019	Burma	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
The Cereal Value Chain (CVC) activity	2013–2018	Mali	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Final
Farmer-to-Farmer (F2F) Program	2014–2018	Global	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Midterm
Livestock for Growth (L4G)	2013–2018	Mali	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Final
Maximizing Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted Sites (MARKETS II)	2012–2017	Nigeria	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Final
The Peace Corps Participating Agency Program Agreement (PAPA)	2011–2017	Global	VCD, nutrition, and finance	Final
Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy (FSP IL)	2013–2020	Global	Research and dissemination	Midterm
Assets and Market Access Innovation Lab (AMA IL)	2012–2018	Global	Research and dissemination	Final
Genomics to Improve Poultry – Innovation Lab (GIP-IL)	2013–2018	Africa	Research and dissemination	Final
The Innovation Lab for Small Scale Irrigation (ILSSI)	2013–2018	Africa	Research and dissemination	Final
Innovation Lab for Collaborative Research on Aquaculture & Fisheries (AquaFish IL)	2013–2018	Global	Research and dissemination	Final
The Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership (SSTP) (x2)	2013–2018	Africa	Research and dissemination	Midterm
The Soybean Innovation Lab (SIL)	2013–2018	Global	Research and dissemination	Final
The Innovation for Agricultural Training and Education (InnovATE) Activity	2012–2017	Global	Research and dissemination	Final
The Feed the Future Knowledge-Driven Agricultural Development (KDAD)	2013–2018	Global	RFS support activities	Final
The Food Security Service Center (FSSC)	2013–2018	Global	RFS support activities	Midterm
FEEDBACK	2012–2017	Global	RFS support activities	Final

ANNEX 3: 2012 FTF RESULTS FRAMEWORK[10]



[10] Numbers under the objective and IR descriptions indicate the number of times the objectives or IRs were found in the 10 available value chain development, nutrition, and finance activities results frameworks.

ANNEX 4: 2016 GFSS RESULTS FRAMEWORK